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Abstract The therapeutic use of genomic sequencing creates
novel and unresolved questions about cost, clinical efficacy,
access, and the disclosure of sequencing results. The disclo-
sure of the secondary results of sequencing poses a particular-
ly challenging ethical problem. Experts disagree about which
results should be shared and public input – especially impor-
tant for the creation of disclosure policies – is complicated by
the complex nature of genetics. Recognizing the value of de-
liberative democratic methods for soliciting informed public
opinion on matters like these, we recruited participants from a
clinical research site for an all-day deliberative democracy
(DD) session. Participants were introduced to the clinical
and ethical issues associated with genomic sequencing, after
which they discussed the tradeoffs and offered their opinions
about policies for the return of secondary results. Participants
(n = 66; mean age = 57 (SD = 15); 70% female; 76% white)
were divided into 10 small groups (5 to 8 participants each)
allowing interactive deliberation on policy options for the re-
turn of three categories of secondary results: 1) medically
actionable results; 2) risks for adult-onset disorders identified
in children; and 3) carrier status for autosomal recessive dis-
orders. In our qualitative analysis of the session transcripts, we
found that while participants favored choice and had a prefer-
ence for making information available, they also acknowl-
edged the risks (and benefits) of learning such information.
Our research reveals the nuanced reasoning used by
members of the public when weighing the pros and
cons of receiving genomic information, enriching our
understanding of the findings of surveys of attitudes
regarding access to secondary results.
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Introduction
Genomic sequencing is increasingly being used as a diagnos-
tic tool to efficiently provide a wide-breadth of molecular data
on genetic conditions and other health related information.
However, because this technology generates so much data, it
may also uncover information about health risks for condi-
tions beyond the original, intended purpose of the clinical
testing. These ‘secondary results’ pose an ethical dilemma
for health care providers: how much of this information –
spanning multiple types of diseases and conditions, with dif-
ferent levels of uncertainty, risk, severity, and actionability –
should be shared with patients? (Berg et al. 2011; Bernhardt
et al. 2015; Helm et al. 2015; Roche and Berg 2015) Further,
because sequencing results can have medical, psychological,
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and social implications (e.g. privacy, insurance) for patients
and their families, they also present a dilemma for public
policy (Downing et al. 2013; Helm et al. 2015; Klitzman
2010; Lohn et al. 2013). When developing policies, how do
we find an ethically appropriate balance that provides patients
and families with important health information while, at
the same time, avoiding potential negative individual
and societal consequences, such as increased healthcare
costs, loss of privacy, and discrimination? (Christenhusz
et al. 2013; Helm et al. 2015; Klitzman 2010; Wauters
and Van Hoyweghen 2016).
Despite efforts to develop policy guidelines, there is no
agreement on how best to approach the disclosure of second-
ary results. Experts including genetics researchers
(Appelbaum et al. 2015; Kleiderman et al. 2015; Middleton
et al. 2016; Rahimzadeh et al. 2015; Ramoni et al. 2013),
genetics health professionals (Brandt et al. 2013; Grove
et al. 2014; Lemke et al. 2013; Lohn et al. 2013; Middleton
et al. 2016; Scheuner et al. 2015; Yu et al. 2014), healthcare
providers (Reiff et al. 2014; Strong et al. 2014), and advisory
bodies (Fabsitz et al. 2010; Green et al. 2013; Weiner 2014)
have all weighed in with preferences and policy recommen-
dations. These recommendations are varied and have generat-
ed much discussion, especially the American College of
Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) 2013 recommen-
dation that a minimum list of 56 genetic results deemed med-
ically actionable should always be returned, regardless of pa-
tient preference, age (including children), or age of onset
(Green et al. 2013). The bioethical critiques of the 2013
ACMG guidelines have primarily centered around patient au-
tonomy and the protection of vulnerable populations (Burke
et al. 2013; Clayton et al. 2014; Holtzman 2013; Klitzman
et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 2013; Vayena and Tasioulas
2013; Wolf et al. 2013). Several experts have argued that
patients should have the option of declining such information
and that decisions regarding genetic testing of children should
be deferred until adulthood if results would not lead to clear
medical benefits in childhood (McGuire et al. 2013;Wolf et al.
2013). These guidelines have since been revised after much
controversy and critical debate (ACMG Board of Directors
2015; American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics
2013; Burke et al. 2013; Clayton et al. 2014; Holtzman 2013;
Klitzman et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 2013; Vayena and
Tasioulas 2013; Wolf et al. 2013).
In addition to expert input, several studies have suggested
that patients, parents, and members of the public want more or
less unrestricted access to secondary genetic results (Bollinger
et al. 2012; Daack-Hirsch et al. 2013; Facio et al. 2013;
Fernandez et al. 2014; Meric-Bernstam et al. 2016;
Middleton et al. 2016; Sanderson et al. 2016; Sapp et al.
2014; Townsend et al. 2012). However, a few studies have
found that preferences shifted toward wanting less informa-
tion when participants had more extensive knowledge,
including that gained as a result of genetic counseling
(Bradbury et al. 2015; Middleton et al. 2016). However, there
are no in-depth studies of the views of the public after receiv-
ing balanced scientific and ethical information relevant to sec-
ondary genomic results.
In order to better inform public policy on secondary geno-
mic results, we used democratic deliberation (DD) methods to
investigate the views of the public regarding potential policies
for the return of secondary results from genomic sequencing
(Gornick et al. 2016). The DD approach involves soliciting
the informed voices of the general public in policy-making
through a process of in-depth education and peer deliberation
(Fishkin 2006; Gastil and Keith 2005; Solomon et al. 2016;
Thompson 2008). DD methodology is being used to elicit the
informed and deliberative input of the general public on a
variety of complex bioethical issues, including biobank re-
search, flu pandemic resource allocation, surrogate consent
for dementia research, and cancer screening (Carman et al.
2015; Kim et al. 2011; McWhirter et al. 2014; Rychetnik
et al. 2013; Silva et al. 2012).
Initial analysis of survey data from our DD study demon-
strated broad support for a policy of returning secondary re-
sults and giving patients a choice to receive or not receive
results related to medically actionable conditions.
Conversely, there was an overall rejection of policies of not
returning secondary results and not providing a choice regard-
ing patients’ carrier status and adult-onset disorders found in
children. However, after participating in the DD session, par-
ticipants became considerably more willing to endorse poli-
cies restricting access to secondary results (Gornick et al.
2016). In order to understand how and why participants ar-
rived at these policy preferences, in this article, we explore
the major themes that emerged in the deliberation among our
participants as they discussed and debated public policies for
the return of secondary results generated through clinical ge-
nomic sequencing.
Methods
Detailed study design and methodological procedures for this
study are described elsewhere (Gornick et al. 2016). The study
was reviewed by the University of Michigan’s Institutional
Review Board and deemed exempt from federal regulations.
Participants
Sixty-six members of the public, recruited via the University of
Michigan Clinical Studies website [http://UMClinicalStudies.
org](Dwyer-White et al. 2011), attended an all-day deliberative
session. Because our volunteer pool tended to be older, whiter,
and more female, we oversampled for age (younger), race/-
ethnicity (African American), and gender (male). In order to
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ensure a sufficient number of participants withmedical encoun-
ters relevant to the clinical use of sequencing, we also
oversampled for those with a personal history of cancer
(Gornick et al. 2016). The demographic characteristics of the
participants are provided in Table 1.
Procedures
Members of the public participated in a day-long DD session,
which included educational presentations by experts and small
group deliberations facilitated by trained staff (Table 2). The
participants were assigned into 10 small groups of up to 8
persons per table (range: 5–8) based on reported personal
history of cancer (3 groups with, 3 groups without, and 4
groups mixed). Each small group was led by a trained facili-
tator with a background in either health education or genetic
counseling (Gornick et al. 2016). Experts and study
team members were accessible throughout the day to
answer questions that arose during the small group de-
liberation. Participants also completed surveys 1 month
before the session, immediately after the session, and
1 month after the session.
The DD day involved presentations by experts in genetics
and bioethics and five small group deliberative sessions. Both
plenary speakers were clinical geneticists with extensive ex-
pertise in genetic testing issues and the second speaker was
also a bioethicist. The presentations were developed iterative-
ly between members of the study team, an expert advisory
panel, and the presenters. The first of the five small group
sessions included an Bicebreaker^ exercise and discussion of
an informational video on genome sequencing and the second
involved a general discussion of the two expert presentations.
The final three small group sessions on policies (see Table 2
for policy descriptions) are the focus of this analysis.
Small Group Voting
We asked our participants to evaluate and vote on pol-
icies for the return of three different types of secondary
results: 1) medically actionable results; 2) childhood dis-
closure of adult-onset disorders to parents; and 3) carri-
er status for autosomal recessive disorders. In each case
the policy included: 1) a default disclosure procedure
(secondary results were either returned or not returned
by default) and 2) if the default was flexible (whether or
not there was a choice to receive the secondary results).
For each of the three policies participants were asked to
vote yes or no on this question: BShould this be the
genome sequencing policy regarding [medically action-
able conditions/adult-onset conditions/carrier status] re-
sults?^ In order to explore the impact of small group
deliberation, votes were taken twice: once after fifteen
minutes of discussion and again near the end of the
session. The intent of requiring participants to vote on
the proposed policy was to encourage dialogue within
the groups. Groups were not required to come to a
consensus, but participants were asked to provide ratio-
nales for their positions.
Analyses
All 30 small group policy deliberation audio-recordings
(10 tables discussing 3 policies each) were transcribed
verbatim. One member of the study team (KAR) read
Table 1 DD participant characteristics (n = 66)
n (%)a
Gender
Female 46 (69.7)
Male 20 (30.3)
Age, Mean (SD) 57.2 (15)
Ethnicity (Bmark all that apply^)
White 50 (75.8)
Black 11 (16.7)
American Indian or Alaskan Native 4 (6.1)
Asian 3 (4.5)
Hispanic 2 (3.0)
Middle Eastern/Arab 1 (1.5)
Other 1 (1.5)
Education
Less than BA 20 (30.3)
BA 17 (25.8)
More than BA 27 (40.9)
Annual household income
Below $40,000 16 (24.2)
$40,000–$79,999 29 (43.9)
More than $80,000 18 (27.3)
Health status
Poor 1 (1.5)
Fair 7 (10.6)
Good 20 (30.3)
Very good 20 (30.3)
Excellent 12 (18.2)
Has children 44 (66.7)
Had genetic testing ordered by a doctor 9 (13.6)
Has personal history of cancer 37 (56.1)
Has family history of…
Cancer 45 (68.2)
Heart disease 38 (57.6)
Neurological disorder 12 (18.2)
a Some percentages do not add to 100 because not all participants an-
swered the question
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through all 30 transcripts and other team members read a
subset of the transcripts. In order to examine the content
of group discussions, we developed a coding scheme
using an iterative method, drawing on codes used in a
previous DD study (De Vries et al. 2013), codes derived
from questions provided to facilitators to generate discus-
sion, as well as the identification and refining of new
codes based on careful reading of the transcripts and
study team discussion. Two study team members coded
six small group sessions to ensure accuracy of coding, as
well as to ensure the clarity and completeness of the
coding scheme. Coding was then conducted by one team
member (KAR) using Dedoose qualitative software.
After coding was completed, each transcript was system-
atically reviewed for the most commonly occurring
themes and representative quotes were identified. In or-
der to identify any shifts in attitudes, we also tracked
policy preferences at multiple time points at the small
group level (Table 3). For this paper, we paid particular
attention to any group-level shifts in voting preferences
(as compared to the pre-DD survey). These groups were
further analyzed to better understand group processes and
the reasoning used in making these shifts.
Results
In small group sessions 3–5, participants were asked to eval-
uate three specific policies for return of secondary results.
There was a distinct and striking pattern to the voting on the
three proposed policies (Table 3). Small groups strongly
agreed with the policy on disclosure of medically actionable
results (in which patients are given results, but have a choice).
At the second vote, 6 out of 10 groups agreed by consensus
and 1 group by majority with the policy for medically action-
able results. However, small groups tended to disagree with
the policies on childhood disclosure of adult-onset conditions
and carrier status results (in which parents/patients are not
given results nor have a choice). At the second vote, only 1
out of 10 groups agreed by consensus and 2 groups by major-
ity with the policy for adult-onset conditions; and only 1 group
agreed by majority (all other groups were consensus
Bdisagree^) with the policy for carrier status results.
In our previous quantitative analysis of participants’ survey
responses, we found that participants did not significantly
change their views regarding the policy for the return of med-
ically actionable results across surveys (Gornick et al. 2016).
However, while the majority still disagreed with the policies
Table 2 Overview of DD session
Introduction Overview of the agenda for the day
Small Group Session 1 Ice breaker exercises
Video, BWhole Genome Sequencing and You^a
Discussion focusing on reactions to the video
Plenary Session 1:
Expert Presentations
Each presentation lasted 50 min, including a 15 min question and
answer session.
Presentation 1: BWhat can we learn from sequencing our genes^
described the science and technology related to genetics and
genomic sequencing.
Presentation 2: BEthical issues in sequencing our genes^ introduced
the bioethical implications of advances in genomic medicine.
Small Group Session 2 Participants were given a chance to reflect upon and discuss the 2
presentations and general thoughts on genomic sequencing. (30 min)
Plenary Session 2:
Policy Presentation
Explanation of proposed policies regarding return of secondary findings
in 3 situations – medically actionable results, adult-onset conditions,
and carrier status. For each policy, participants were asked to consider
BShould this be the genomic sequencing policy?^
Small Group Session 3 Discuss & vote on proposed policy: BPatients are given medically
actionable results that are not related to the reason for the sequencing.
Patients have a choice: They can ask to not be given these results.^
(30 min)
Small Group Session 4 Discuss & vote on proposed policy:BChildren and their parents are
not given results for adult-onset conditions that are not related to the
reason for the sequencing. Children and their parents have no choice:
They will not be given these results even if they want them.^ (30 min)
Small Group Session 5 Discuss & vote on proposed policy: BPatients are not given carrier status
results that are not related to the reason for the sequencing. Patients
have no choice: They will not be given these results even if
they want them.^ (30 min)
a © 2015 Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai
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for adult-onset and carrier status, participants’ views did
change between the pre- and post-DD surveys, becoming in-
creasingly supportive of policies in which parents/patients are
not given results and do not have a choice. For the policy on
the return of adult-onset results, participants remained signif-
icantly more supportive at 1-month follow-up.
Looking at attitudes toward the disclosure policies for
adult-onset disorders and carrier status results by small group
at the pre-DD survey, we find that majorities in all groups
disapproved of both (Table 3). However, we also see a shift
toward becoming more supportive of the policy for adult-
onset results during the voting (as compared to the pre-DD
survey) with a few small groups agreeing with the policy by
majority (small groups 3, 6, and 10), which is reflected in their
responses to the post-DD survey. For carrier status, one small
group (10) shifted toward agreement with the policy by ma-
jority both during voting and at the post-DD survey. For med-
ically actionable results, while seven of ten small groups voted
to support the policy, three small groups (1, 4, and 6)
disagreed with the policy by majority during voting.
However, this view was reflected in only one small group
(1) by majority at the post-DD survey.
To better understand the views of participants, we looked at
the content of their small group discussions. We wanted to
learn: 1) why participants tended to approve of the policy for
medically actionable results (in which patients are given re-
sults, but have a choice), but disapprove of the adult-onset and
carrier status policies (in which parents/patients are not given
results nor have a choice); 2) why some small groups shifted
their views, especially with regard to adult-onset (and in 1
small group, carrier status) results; and 3) participant concerns
and reservations about the policies and how they wished these
concerns to be addressed.
Overall Attitudes toward Policies
Certain key themes emerged in our analysis to explain the
differences in participants’ attitudes toward the three policies:
a general preference for choice, a preference for information,
and a concern over the risks (and benefits) of having or not
having choice and/or information.
Preference for Choice
Participants emphasized the importance of flexibility and
choice throughout all three policy sessions–medically action-
able (MA), adult-onset (AO), and carrier status (CS) results:
Table 3 Agreement with policy by survey and small group voting
Small
group 1
(n = 8)
n (%)
Small
group 2
(n = 8)
n (%)
Small
group 3
(n = 6)
n (%)
Small
group 4
(n = 8)
n (%)
Small
group 5
(n = 7)
n (%)
Small
group 6
(n = 5)
n (%)
Small
group 7
(n = 6)
n (%)
Small
group 8
(n = 6)
n (%)
Small
group 9
(n = 5)
n (%)
Small
group 10
(n = 7)
n (%)
Medically Actionable
Pre-DD Survey 6 (85.7) 8 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 7 (87.5) 7 (100.0) 4 (80.0) 6 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 4 (80.0) 5 (71.4)
Vote 1 2 (25.0) 8 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 6 (75.0) 7 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 6 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 5 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Vote 2 1 (12.5) 8 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 2 (25.0) 7 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (83.3) 6 (100.0) 5 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Post-DD Survey 3 (37.5) 7 (87.5) 6 (100.0) 5 (62.5) 7 (100.0) 5 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 4 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Follow-up Survey 6 (85.7) 7 (100.0) 4 (66.7) 8 (100.0) 6 (85.7) 5 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 5 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Adult Onset Conditions
Pre-DD Survey 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (20.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (20.0) 2 (28.6)
Vote 1 1 (12.5) 2 (25.0) 5 (83.3) 3 (37.5) 1 (14.3) 4 (80.0) 2 (33.3) 3 (50.0) 2 (40.0) 6 (85.7)
Vote 2 1 (12.5) 2 (25.0) 6 (100.0) 3 (37.5) 0 (0.0) 4 (80.0) 1 (16.7) 3 (50.0) 2 (40.0) 6 (85.7)
Post-DD Survey 2 (28.6) 2 (25.0) 6 (100.0) 4 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (60.0) 1 (16.7) 2 (33.3) 2 (40.0) 6 (85.7)
Follow-up Survey 1 (14.3) 3 (42.9) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 2 (28.6) 1 (25.0) 1 (16.7) 2 (33.3) 2 (40.0) 2 (33.3)
Carrier Status
Pre-DD Survey 1 (12.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 1 (14.3) 1 (20.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Vote 1 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 1 (16.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (83.3)
Vote 2 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (83.3)
Post-DD 2 (25.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (50.0) 4 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (25.0) 5 (71.4)
Follow-up Survey 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3) 1 (16.7) 1 (12.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (20.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3)
Valid percent as not all participants responded to every question. See Table 2 for descriptions of each of the three proposed policies
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ID-13: If I’m responsible for my own life, I should be
making the choices about what I hear and when I hear
it, not somebody else. (MA)
ID-39: I think the parents should have, you know, that
option. I think that they should have the flexibility of
asking for that information if they want it . . .that they
should be able to get it if they want it. (AO)
ID-52: The whole point is that the patient should have
the choice. ID-67:Exactly. That’s what it boils down to
for me. Choice. (CS)
As seen in Table 2, the policy for return of medically ac-
tionable results, included flexibility, i.e. patients could choose
to receive or not receive these results. Small groups empha-
sized the importance of having this choice in their agreement
with this policy.
ID-68: I think it’s a very reasonable policy, giving the
patient the option . . . The doc might say, BHey, we found
other things in your genomic sequencing that you might
want to know that has an effect on your future
healthcare.^ You’re giving the patient the option to de-
cline that or . . . I think it’s a very reasonable policy. I
think it would be a fair and reasonable policy. (MA)
On the other hand, the policies for return of adult-
onset and carrier status results did not include flexibil-
ity, i.e. parents and children (for adult-onset) and pa-
tients (for carrier status) were not given the choice to
receive the results. Small groups tended to react nega-
tively to this lack of choice:
ID-06: Once that word Bchoice^ comes up and you tell
people, Bwe’re taking it away from you,^ they get up in
arms over it. (AO)
ID-29: I just believe that, again, it’s my genome and I
should have the choice on whether or not I want that
information. So, I would say, Bno.^ I vote Bno^ on this
policy because I think that I should have a choice. (CS)
Choice Respects Personal/Cultural Differences
Participants gave a number of reasons for preferring
policies (regardless of type of result) that included
choice. They recognized that people are diverse in their
informational needs, their ability to handle information,
and their personal and cultural values, and felt that
these differences should be respected. For example, par-
ticipants acknowledged that others may wish to have
more or less information: BJust because I would want
the information, it doesn’t mean somebody else should
be forced to hear it.^ (ID-14, MA)
Participants asserted the need for flexibility due to
concerns that some individuals may not be able to han-
dle this information:
ID-50: Ultimately you’d want to do what’s in the best
interest of the patient. So, they’re not wanting to know
the information because they’re afraid that they’ll be too
anxious, then you can work with that. I think that
counselling ahead of time would be really helpful. And
I do think patients have the right to know or not to know.
(MA)
Participants also acknowledged that diverse personal and
cultural beliefs may play a role in people’s different choices
about information:
ID-34: I think because we are a democracy, we respect
other peoples’ ethics and religious and all those things, I
think you want to be as inclusive as possible in the broad
sense so that everybody has access, and that person then
gets a choice to either opt-in or opt-out and say, BNo.
I’m not interested.^ (CS)
An individual’s right to choose also was recognized as an
important shared cultural value: ID-51: This is America, and
so why aren’t we allowed to have the choice? ID-53: Exactly.
ID-50: It’s my body. (MA)
Choosing Not to Know
Others stressed that an individual’s right not to know was also
an important value:
ID-39: I don’t think that you can force people to take the
information and be expected to act on it if they don’t
want the information. I do think that there are people
who don’t want to know, you know? I mean we all know
a family who’s had a child and they had the option of
knowing in prenatal testing and said, BI don’t want to
know.^ And they had a baby, and that baby has maybe
significant problems, but you can’t make people, you
know . . . FACILITATOR: Choose to find out. ID-39:
…choose to find out if they don’t want to. I mean they
have a right to not know. I think that’s as much of a
choice, you know? (CS)
In fact, for some participants, this ‘right not to know’ su-
perseded societal benefit even in the context of results that are
medically actionable:
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ID-11: The individual’s right to choose trumps whatever
societal benefit. And the other part of it is, what really
scares me, is that somebody in Congress might get an
idea to pass legislation that says that you don’t get med-
ical care anymore because you ignored the risk of this
condition and developed it. You didn’t get the reasonable
precautions. ID-16: That would be like leaving the guys
without their helmets on the side of the road when they
get in an accident. (MA)
Choosing for Children
The issue of choice in the context of the adult-onset conditions
was complicated by the question: BWhose choice is it,
anyway?^ Does the choice belong to the parent(s) or the
child? One participant sets out the conundrum: BSee, that’s
the problem. You know, someone making a decision for an
individual early on versus having that individual make it for
himself later.^ (ID-70, AO) However, most small groups em-
phasized that parents should have a choice to know (or not) in
the case of adult-onset conditions: BMy point is that that’s my
kid, and if they have that information and I want it, I should be
able to get it.^ (ID-29, AO)
Participants presented several reasons why parents’ right to
choose takes precedence over their children’s rights. One par-
ticipant pointed out that children are not yet able to make
fully-informed decisions on their own: BAs a parent, there’s
a maturity level that you have to consider. Although I have a
17-year-old that’s intelligent and well-rounded, she’s still im-
mature. So, I just. .. I think parents should have a choice.^ (ID-
30, AO) Another pointed out that children’s right to choose
should not equal that of adults: BChildren should not have the
same level of choice as adults.^ (ID-16, AO) Another partic-
ipant pointed out that parents make decisions for their children
all the time: BHow many choices do we make as parents then?
We make choices every day for our children that are going to
affect them into adulthood.^ (ID-67, AO) In fact, parents
have this right to make decisions for their children even if they
may make mistakes: BParents make choices that are bad for
their kids all their lives. So, they have a right to know this.^
(ID-47, AO) And policies that take away parental rights to
make choices for their children are suspect: BNow to me, that
strikes of big brother looking out for you.^ (ID-67, AO)
However, other participants pointed out that parents’ hav-
ing the right to choose to know this information takes away
children’s future autonomy and their right to choose for them-
selves later.
ID-36: As far as I understand the reasoning behind it,
this will not affect a child until they’re an adult, and they
should make their own decisions at that time. (AO)
ID-66: I mean you’re not getting consent from the pa-
tient. My concern is that you’re . . . this is protecting the
patient which is the child, and so when the parents are
not given the choice and not given the information,
you’re allowing that child to consent to whatever . . .
eventually to consent. So it’s protecting the rights of the
actual patient who is the child. (AO)
This perspective was clearly reflected in the three small
groups (3, 6, and 10) who shifted toward agreement with the
adult-onset policy of non-disclosure/no choice during voting.
Participants in these small groups argued that a policy of non-
disclosure of adult-onset conditions protects a child’s right to
choose later when they become an adult:
ID-46: One of the pros is that because the child is not of
age to consent and/or decide if they themselves want the
results, that this gives no option that their . . . choice
would be compromised because it doesn’t offer that
choice. So technically, that is a pro for that potential
child. (AO)
ID-70: I think that at some point it’s this child’s decision.
So I think, you know, if they want to know at 18 or
whatever their sequencing information, then they should
have the ability to do that if the sequencing has been
done as a child or whatever and has been sitting there. I
think they should have the right then to find out for
themselves. (AO)
One participant illustrated this point using the example of
Btwo sons^:
ID-19: Let’s say I did have two sons, right, and
both of them . . . You know some test was done
and both of them had a gene that they were going
to get Alzheimer’s in their fifties. One of them might
want to know that based on his personality. He
would want to know. BAlright, I’m gonna get
Alzheimer’s in my fifties unless maybe I can do this,
this, this and reduce my risk.^ The other one would
be like, BNo, don’t tell me. I want to live my full
life.^ Kind of like . . . more like ID-18’s view on
these things. But because those two kids might treat
it differently and the onset would be so late in their
lives, maybe when they were 18 or 20 or 25, they
could decide for themselves. One kid would be like,
BYeah, I want to get tested to see if I have the
Alzheimer’s thing.^ The other one would be like,
BNo, don’t tell me.^ So part of me is wondering,
do I have the right to make that decision for my
sons or daughters when they might have wanted the
other alternative if they were older? (AO)
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When Choice Not to Know Harms
In the context of medically actionable results, a majority of
participants and small groups supported the policy, which in-
cluded flexibility. However, in a few groups participants ar-
gued that there should not be a choice to refuse secondary
results because not knowing this medical information could
be harmful. Small group 4, for example, moved from a ma-
jority in support of the policy at first vote to majority not
supporting the policy at the second vote because they felt
individuals should be required to receive secondary results
that are medically actionable:
ID-29: If it’s something that’s preventable and, you
know, treatable, screenable, preventable, whatever, they
should know. That’s something they should know, not
only for the . . . BWell, I’m going to sue the doctor later,^
but also because . . . for the same reason they tell you
about high blood pressure or high cholesterol or what-
ever . . . so that you can do something about it. (MA)
Individuals in other small groups also expressed concern
about flexibility, noting that finding out about medically ac-
tionable conditions may benefit the individual, their family,
and society:
ID-01: Absolutely I would want to know. And it’s fair-
ness to the people . . . to my family . . . in fairness to
society . . . You know, what if I have nobody to take care
of me and I end up, you know, wherever because I
haven’t been able to plan financially and emotionally
and socially? (MA)
ID-11: I basically agree with this philosophy, but I have
one serious concern. All of these results that would nor-
mally be disclosed are medically actionable, meaning
that they can either be reduced or prevented. Don’t we
have an obligation to know these things and act on
them, because otherwise we’re using up medical re-
sources? It’s the same concept as having to wear a hel-
met when you ride a motorcycle and wear a seatbelt, in
that if you don’t do those things, you may incur huge
costs to society for your own adventuresome self, and
why should we permit that to happen? (MA, emphasis
added)
Preference for Information
In their policy discussions, many participants expressed
their preference for receiving information about second-
ary results (regardless of type): BKnowledge is power.
You know how to plan for your life or whatever that’s
going to come along if you know. I want to know. Don’t
sugarcoat anything for me.^ (ID-25, MA)
Benefits of Knowing/Risks of Not Knowing
In the context of medically actionable results, participants
stressed the potential harms to the patient of not knowing this
type of information:
ID-01: I’m just wondering that it’s an ethical issue that
you should be told. If you know that there’s something
wrong with you on down . . . that is a medically action-
able situation, that you have an ethical . . . You have to
ethically tell that person. It’s like, BWhat you don’t know
won’t hurt you.^But in this case, what you don’t know
will hurt you. (MA)
Participants also emphasized that receiving medically ac-
tionable information would allow patients to take positive
action, to possibly improve or save their lives:
ID-66: I do think there are a lot of good sides to this
policy because it does allow access to information that
could give…you know, I would have the responsibility of
taking care of, but it also lets me . . . I can invest in that
condition or in that situation. I can make changes to
hopefully have a better outcome for myself. So it gives
me that option of getting information that could be ben-
eficial for me. (MA)
This preference for information was also frequently
discussed in the context of adult-onset and carrier status pol-
icies (both of which provided no access to this information).
Participants stressed the benefits of knowing information for
parents or patients in decision-making, planning, and the wel-
fare of children (or potential children).
ID-37: If there’s something that they can prevent or al-
leviate that might occur as a result of it, why not test for
it and give that information? That doesn’t seem very
unreasonable to me if we’re practicing preventative
medicine. If we can find that now to enhance that child’s
lifestyle or life 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 years, why not give
that information? (AO)
One participant discussed protective measures they could
take with their own children:
ID-15: As I think about it, both mymother and my father
were type II diabetes, and I would want to know if my
kids, you know, were at risk depending on who I was
married to and what her DNAwas all about, and then I
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guess I would be careful with those kids that they don’t
overeat, that I don’t urge seconds on them. (AO)
Another participant pointed out that this information could
help patients make decisions about their future child-bearing,
given individuals’ varying abilities to copewith the challenges
of children with serious conditions:
ID-22: I do think it is a tool and, you know, as much as
all of us love our children, we’re fortunate enough that
we can be in a place where no matter what, we
had the wherewithal emotionally, financially, spir-
itually to take care of those kids and not all peo-
ple are equipped to do those things, and they need
to make decisions. Not everybody can take care of
a special needs child. (CS)
In the context of adult-onset policy, some participants wor-
ried that if parents fail to find out information now, the child
might not find out later when they were an adult or when the
information is most needed/becomes relevant.
ID-52: If you’re at the place right then and there
to obtain that information as opposed to waiting
until your child is 18 or 21 or something like that,
where it may become more difficult to get that
information, I would kind of like there to be the
option . . .at least the option. (AO)
One participant used her own experience of early breast
cancer and her daughter’s risk as an example: BIf you know
something, you can act on it. And if you don’t know about it. ..
She may end up getting breast cancer in her twenties like I
did.^ (ID-48, AO)
In the context of carrier status, participants placed an em-
phasis not only on the potential negative impact of withhold-
ing such information from individuals and families, but also
the potential impact it might have on society:
ID-69: I’m not wanting to open it wide to a fishing
expedition, but I’m thinking if there are life-threatening
and expensive . . . That’s not just an individual good.
That’s a societal good if we can prevent it, and sickle cell
is the only example that I know of . . . I don’t know, there
may be others, but . .. That one troubles me. (CS)
ID-50: For society, I think the testing would be cost ef-
fective because when you think about the cost of a med-
ical care for a disabled child, it’s astronomical. And so to
pay out $1,000 to get testing would be nothing. (CS)
Interestingly, the only small group (10) who voted to
support the policy on carrier status (which includes non-
disclosure and no choice) did so, despite expressing a strong
preference for receiving this type of information.
ID-72: What harm could [this information] do? ID-75:
More risk to not being given it. ID-70: More risk not to
be. Again, power is knowledge. It’s just a piece of
information. ID-72: The benefit outweighs the risk. (CS)
Their decision to accept the policy was the result of their
understanding that retrieving secondary carrier status results
would require additional cost, effort and analysis by the ge-
netics laboratory to generate and interpret this type of second-
ary information. As pointed out by one participant: BBut if the
information is not there, they cannot force the analysis to be
done because they want it to be done.^ (ID-70, CS) This
reasoning was unique. Some groups did not focus on the cost
and effort of the additional analysis required to obtain this
information. Other groups believed the information was, or
could be, readily available: B…we’re probably talking about
microseconds or seconds anyway of additional computer time
by which you could develop information…^ (ID-11, CS) or felt
the benefits of knowing (or having a choice to know)
outweighed the cost of additional analysis. The concern of
group 10 appears to have originated in an earlier session
(AO) when, in response to a question by a group member,
an expert pointed out that the clinician does not actually have
the information in hand. This response altered their thinking
about the AO policy (in addition to their concerns regarding
children’s rights) and the CS policy.
Benefits of Not Knowing/Risks of Knowing
While participants communicated a strong preference for
choice and information, they also expressed reservations.
Many small groups and individuals discussed the potential
risks of finding out these different types of information, or
put another way, the benefits of not knowing and not having
a choice. These reservations were expressed across all result
types, but most often during the MA policy discussion—as
this policy provided both information and choice.
Information Overload
Several participants were concerned that patients may experi-
ence information overload.
ID-17: I think some people maybe just couldn’t or
wouldn’t want to handle a bunch of extra information.
You know, they just might have enough on their plate
already, so to speak. So to find out, BOh, when you’re
this age you’re going to get this, B. . . It’s like, BDon’t tell
me. I . . . You know, life’s hard enough.^ (MA)
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Participants were also concerned about parents being
overloaded with their children’s adult-onset information: B.. .
it’s a disservice to the parents. You run the risk of giving them
TMI. Let’s not overload them.^ (ID-69, AO)
Information Requires Interpretation
Participants pointed out that patients may not only experience
information overload, but theymight not have the ability (for a
variety of reasons) to fully understand this complex genetic
information:
ID-42: I kind of have a caution. I guess the concern
would be for misinterpretation if you give full disclosure
to the patient . . . them accepting that and getting that,
and interpreting that, which could be a wrong interpre-
tation in some instances about the disease, the severity
of it. (MA)
One participant also noted the potential educational barriers
to informed consent:
ID-66: I’ve had 16 years of education, and so I’m not
coming in with a third grade education. I’m not coming
in with a low literacy level. And so I guess my concern
would be that if someone is giving consent, how in-
formed is it?^(MA)
Information Leads to Anxiety
Participants also expressed concern that patients may experi-
ence anxiety and fear if they found out this type of informa-
tion: BIt can cause a lot of people to behave differently, for
good and for worse. It can cause undue anxiety, depression,
suicide.^ (ID-12, MA)
One participant pointed out that this information might end
up causing additional health harms:
ID-50:. . . to play the devil’s advocate . . . what if patients
become so anxious that their blood pressure goes up
and everything goes up, so their risk factor for cardiac
disease go up because they’re so afraid. Or they may
become fatalistic. They’ll say, BWell, I’m going to get it
anyway . . . might as well eat this ice cream.^ (MA)
In the context of adult-onset policy, participants also wor-
ried that parents’ knowledge about their children’s risk for
adult-onset disorders may cause distress:
ID-26: So it’s everybody’s choice, you know. When my
husband first got [the condition], I felt like I needed to
rush my kids in right away and get them all MRIs and
everything, but as I thought about that and thought
about that, it was like, you know, BNo, I can’t do that.^
It would be like. . . It would just be too terrifying, all the
time being worried . . . (AO)
Information Interferes with Relationships
Participants were also concerned that this information may
result in parents overprotecting and restricting children who
get ‘labelled’ with a risk for an adult-onset condition. They
worried that parents may overprotect their children and that
these children may not get the opportunity to lead a normal
childhood:
ID-51: You know, when a child comes to elementary
school and the parents have taken them to the doctor
since they were 4 and they have ADD and ADHD . . .
They have a label, and that child is treated differently,
and I feel like . . . not necessarily in the education realm .
. . they’ll be treated differently, but if a parent knows that
their child has a potential for breast cancer, well then
they’re going to sit there and they’re going to go out of
their way for things because that’s typically what par-
ents do, and I feel like that . . . some of these things could
hinder a child. You know, like . . . most people think that
Alzheimer’s is when things start to go wrong in the head.
Well, you can’t play football because you’ll get a con-
cussion. You could get maybe an earlier onset. You can’t
do this . . . ID-50: What’s wrong with that? ID-51: I’m
not saying that football is the safest sport, but I’m just . .
. You know, the child might become hindered in just
growing up because at one point in time they could
potentially have this and, you know, they’re held back
from their potential to even just enjoy themselves. ID-
47: Overprotected and sheltered . . . (AO)
Information and Stigma
Across all policies, participants expressed concerns that indi-
viduals who learn secondary results may be at greater risk for
loss of privacy, discrimination and stigma. One participant
worried about the consequences of medically actionable infor-
mation being entered into their medical record:
ID-58: For me, the revelation was if you decide to take
the choice and be given the results, you’re opening it up
to your doctor and to your healthcare company as well.
It will be on your medical record, and then it might be
held against you at some point if you don’t get the
treatment for something, so . . . And I didn’t think
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it would bother me as much . . . but it’s starting to
bother me. (MA)
Another participant discussed the possible implications of
having access to adult-onset information in a society which
already struggles with issues of inequality and discrimination:
ID-19: So I guess the main thing I was thinking is
that right now in our society, we struggle with
things like racism, sexism and other forms of dis-
crimination. If in the future there’s a case where
the majority of people . . . their genomes are test-
ed and known, that can become a really big
source of stigma and discrimination as well, and
there might be situations where, you know, a guy
is 30 years old and applying for a job and his
employers find out that he’s going to develop
Huntington’s because it’s an autosomal dominant
disease and there’s nothing you can do about it.
He’s going to develop it in his forties or fifties.
They might not hire that person, you know.
There’s not just Huntington’s, but there’s many ex-
amples of diseases where you’re going to get it if
you have that gene. So this might be another
source of discrimination just like our other social
identities that we struggle with now. (AO)
In small group 3, it was concerns like these – about stigma
and discrimination – (along with support for children’s rights)
that prompted a shift to support for the AO policy, in which
parents are not given results and do not have a choice to
receive them.
In the context of carrier status, one participant brought up
the ethical challenges that may arise within society over dis-
ability rights and parents choosing not to have children with
certain types of conditions:
ID-46: I think the sticky part is figuring out where that
line is and who gets to determine that line because, you
know, I think about the disability community and the fact
that there is a community of people who do identify
positively as being members of that community
and that there is a culture there, and passing judg-
ment as somebody who does not experience any
physical disabilities or mental disabilities that limit
me in a strong way, to be able to make that choice
of whether or not that is ethically sound. Does that
make sense? Okay. So, for example, thinking about
people who are part of the deaf community . . . may
not see themselves as having wanted to be hearing.
They may positively identify with being deaf, but
would their potential parents decide, BWell, I don’t
want to raise a deaf child^? (CS)
Uncertainty and the Value of Information
Participants were also concerned about individuals taking on
these potential risks of knowing this information, when the
very nature of the genetic information includes uncertain-
ty—that these secondary results only provide information
about a risk to potentially get (or to pass along) a condition.
ID-18: The bottom line is I don’t want to go through life
worrying about what I could get, do you know what I’m
saying? I’ve got to try to keep my head on straight deal-
ing with all this craziness out here and just, you know,
live a balanced life . .. eat healthy, exercise, whatever,
you know, but I don’t need to know a bunch of stuff that
might happen to me, you know, down the road. (MA)
ID-08: In that way, if you think about it like a physician,
that makes sense because these results are not 100%
sure. So they do not want parents . . . I am talking for
the policy now . . . They do not want parents to be
stressed out that their kid might be getting cancer [. .
.] because these results are not 100%. So why do you
want to tell parents that, BOh, your child might get
leukemia.^ BBut are you sure?^ BNo.^(AO)
A summary of the comments we heard regarding the ben-
efits of not knowing and the risks of knowing can be found in
one group’s discussion (6) about the proposed MA policy (in
which patients are given results, but have a choice). This was
the only group that voted by consensus against the MA policy
(Table 3), a shift generated by their conversation about the
downsides of genetic information. Among the concerns men-
tioned were information overload, lack of medical knowledge
and misunderstanding of information, not knowing what to do
with the information, and the risk of too much testing with
uncertain benefit. A few participants proposed that informa-
tion overload could be reduced by allowingmore choice (giv-
ing individuals the opportunity to select the types of MA re-
sults to be returned). One participant suggested the dangers
posed by genetic information could be abated by allowing a
clinician to decide what information to share. This shift in
group 6, however, did not persist to the post-DD survey.
Toward Better Policies
The small groups provided several recommendations to make
the policies better, safer and/or fairer. As seen in their prefer-
ence for choice, the most common recommendation was to
provide flexibility in the policies that did not allow choice (the
adult-onset and carrier status policies), but participants had
additional ideas about how to improve the proposed polices.
There was widespread concern about the quality of in-
formed consent (particularly in case of MA policy in which
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patients are given results, but have a choice). For example,
small group members found it important to provide patients
with sufficient time to ask questions and process information:
ID-57: So I think that it would be helpful to have some
time . . . I don’t know howmuch time people would need,
but I know I’ve been in the doctor’s office before and I’ve
been smacked with something that I was not expecting,
and I didn’t even . . . I couldn’t think . . . I just couldn’t
react, you know, until afterwards. (MA)
Participants also stressed the need for support from trained
specialists to help patients to process and understand complex
genetic information.
ID-27: Is that doctor qualified to give a context
for this very, very scary but new information, this
new technology, and I’m thinking about is there a
whole new breed of medical social workers going
to be hand-in-hand with the doctors saying, BOh,
by the way, here’s what this means and this is the
context for this.^ I’m not sure doctors today are
qualified to give a context for this kind of power-
ful information. (MA)
ID-42: I’m just throwing it out there . . . but you have a
professional available for the person that is being
counseled on what . . . what the findings are and ways
to process it. (MA)
ID-50: I think that counselling ahead of time would be
really helpful. And I do think patients have the right to
know or not to know. (MA)
Another concern focused on the necessity of safeguards
against discrimination.
ID-03: Their insurance should not be influenced by
whatever status they may have . . . more prone to this.
What they’re going to charge . . . That shouldn’t enter
into the picture at all. FACILITATOR: So if parents do
find out the carrier status and then they elect to have the
child anyway, you’re saying that should not . . . Is that
the situation . . . ? ID-03: It should not affect the child’s
insurance possibilities. (CS)
ID-59: Being able to use this information, and I’m won-
dering if there could be some kind of preventative clause
that this would be . . . If an insurance company finds out
that you have the potential to get this or the potential to
get that, they can’t use that against you because that
should fall under the . . . Let’s say Americans with
Disabilities Act. They can’t discriminate against people
with HIV for instance or any kind of physical disability
from being hired. (MA)
Some participants discussed the desirability of an Bopt-in^
policy model (i.e. you don’t get secondary results, unless you
request them): BI think it’s a lot of over-testing that doesn’t
need to happen, but with the flexibility that you could ask for
it if you wanted.^ (ID-39, CS) In fact, small group 1 voted
against the opt-out policy on medically actionable results (i.e.
you automatically get secondary results, unless you refuse),
because a majority preferred an opt-in model to better protect
individuals and groups who do not want to know this type of
information:
ID-07: I guess my thinking when I heard that is that I’d
like to see it the other way around where you opt in to
get it versus opting out as the default since it’s unknown
and there’s certain groups that don’t want that data. So
maybe we should be cognizant of that. (MA)
Finally, in the context of adult-onset results, participants
made recommendations to preserve the data and to allow de-
ferred choice to children when they became adults: BI would
mandate that the information be maintained in that child’s
record and offered to them when they are at the age of
majority.^ (ID-38, AO)
Discussion
In our previous report of pre- and post-DD survey responses,
we found that participants strongly agreed with policies on
return of secondary genomic results that included the flexibil-
ity to choose to receive (or not receive) information and that
they strongly disagreed with policies that provided no infor-
mation and no flexibility. Importantly, however, support for
the two policies that included non-disclosure – carrier screen-
ing and testing children for adult-onset conditions ––
increased after education by experts and deliberation amongst
peers. Support for the non-disclosure policy for adult-onset
results shifted from 9% to 44% and support for carrier status
increased from 5% to 22% (Gornick et al. 2016).
Our qualitative analysis of small group deliberations pro-
vides a deeper understanding of the underlying attitudes to-
ward these policies, helping us to better appreciate why edu-
cation and deliberation increased participant willingness to
support policies that restrict access to secondary results. Like
others, we found a strong preference for choice and the dis-
closure of information (Bollinger et al. 2012; Daack-Hirsch
et al. 2013; Facio et al. 2013; Fernandez et al. 2014; Meric-
Bernstam et al. 2016; Middleton et al. 2016; Sanderson et al.
2016; Sapp et al. 2014; Townsend et al. 2012). However,
when we listen in on the small group conversations, it is clear
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that participants used the information from the education ses-
sions, their deliberations with each other, and their own expe-
riences, to consider the risks and conflicts that may arise from
having a choice or receiving information. Participants ac-
knowledged that personal and cultural values vary and that
people have different informational needs and abilities to pro-
cess information. They also noted that receiving information
about secondary results could negatively impact patients’ (and
parents’ and children’s) quality of life and may result in dis-
tress, anxiety, loss of privacy, discrimination, and stigma.
Participants recognized that a person has a right to choose
not to find out information that may have important and irre-
versible personal, familial, and societal consequences.
After reflecting on these concerns, participants recom-
mended safeguards to protect against the risks of choice.
Among these suggested safeguards were strategies for ensur-
ing a truly informed consent by allowing patients time to ask
questions and to consider the potential consequences before
consenting, as well as having trained specialists (i.e., genetic
counselors) to help them process and understand complex
genetic information.
Previous studies found that genetic counseling and more
extensive knowledge shifted preferences toward a desire for
less, rather than more genetic risk information (Bradbury et al.
2015; Middleton et al. 2016). Our study found similar shifts in
the public’s policy preferences for the return of secondary
genomic results, suggesting that in-depth education and peer
deliberation may lead to a more nuanced (and sometimes
more critical) view of the value of this type of information.
Our findings also speak to the strength of democratic deliber-
ation as a method for soliciting informed public opinion.
Educating the lay public on the ethical and scientific complex-
ities associated with genomic sequencing and allowing them
to take part in small group discussions, generated reasoned
shifts in policy preferences. This is consistent with previous
DD research that found changes in policy views were not only
due to participants becoming more informed from the educa-
tional presentations, but also from talking with peers about the
underlying issues (Kim et al. 2011).
Our qualitative analysis of participants’ deliberations pro-
vides a richer understanding of the reasoning that underlies
these shifts in policy preferences. Listening to participant de-
liberations, we discovered that concern for the child’s future
autonomy and appreciation of the potential harms to the child
– including labeling, stigma, and discrimination – increased
support for policies that restrict the disclosure of secondary
results related to adult-onset conditions. It is important to keep
this finding in mind as the clinical use of genomic sequencing
in pediatric and adolescent populations becomes more com-
mon, making it necessary to decide whether secondary alter-
ations associated with adult-onset conditions should be pur-
posefully sought and returned (Mody et al. 2015). As stated by
the American Academy of Pediatrics and American College
of Medical Genetics and Genomics, and reinforced by the
American Society of Human Genetics position statement,
the decision to offer genetic testing and screening should be
driven by the best interest of the child and should be made in
the setting of genetic counseling (Botkin et al. 2015;
Committee on Bioethics 2013; Ross et al. 2013).
While participant views on carrier status policy remained
overwhelming negative, one small group, despite expressing a
strong preference for carrier status information, voted for the
policy by majority because the analysis was not already com-
pleted and would require additional steps and cost to generate
this type of secondary information. Finally, while views on the
policy for medically actionable policy (with disclosure and
flexibility) remained overwhelmingly positive and did not sig-
nificantly change across surveys, some small groups withheld
approval during deliberation and voting due to concerns about
the risks of knowing information, preference for an opt-in vs.
opt-out model, and preference for no choice due to the results
being medically actionable and potentially life-threatening.
Study Limitations
There are important limitations to our analysis. Our popula-
tion was recruited through a clinical studies website and
oversampled for a number of demographic characteristics, in-
cluding a personal history of cancer. Also, because DD ses-
sions require a considerable time commitment on behalf of the
participants, there is likely some level of self-selection. Our
sample was also highly educated, disproportionately female,
and had very few Hispanics and, therefore, results will not be
representative of the general public. To broaden the represen-
tativeness of public input, it would be useful to have any
future DD sessions recruit more diverse members of the gen-
eral public. It is also important to note, that despite in-depth
educational presentations, some participants struggled to un-
derstand certain aspects of genomic sequencing – such as the
work required to make secondary results available, who will
know the information (even if patients choose not to receive
that information), or the precise definitions of Badult-onset,^
Bcarrier status,^ and Bmedically actionable.^ In a few instances,
thesemisunderstandings persisted, despite repeated explanation
by experts. This limitation, however, may also be considered an
important finding, underscoring the difficulty of explaining ge-
netics to a lay audience. Future studies that elicit lay perspec-
tives on genomic results must give careful consideration to
what members of the public need to know and how to best
convey that information. A final limitation of our re-
search is that given sample size constraints, we could
not assess whether the deliberation or the educational
aspect of the DD accounted for movement in partici-
pants’ views. However, we know from earlier research
using DD methodology that information alone does not
account for these changes (Kim et al. 2011).
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Policy Implications and Research Recommendations
Our study demonstrates that while the public appears to
strongly support policies that provide disclosure and flexibil-
ity with regard to return of secondary genomic sequencing
results, after education and deliberation they recognize the
potential barriers and risks related to these preferences. As
seen in the reasoning they used, our participants developed a
more nuanced and critical perspective on receiving secondary
results information. This study confirms the value of a DD
approach for soliciting public input on genomic medicine
and for providing an in-depth understanding of the reasons
given by members of the public for their policy positions.
Education by content experts enhances the lay public’s aware-
ness of the intricacies of precision medicine and this, together
with discussion amongst peers, is an effective way to obtain
informed and considered public opinions and, therefore,
should be used in developing societal policies involving com-
plex ethical and scientific elements.
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